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The existence of relative price momentum in stocks, that past winners continue to win
and past losers continue to lose, is generally viewed as a serious challenge to the \ecient
markets hypothesis". Therefore, it is not surprising that a large literature has evolved trying
to explain the momentum phenomenon - i.e., why momentum strategies appear to earn large
positive abnormal returns on average.
When a strategy as simple as buying past winners and selling past losers produces an almost
free lunch, i.e., high returns on average with little or no systematic risk, we are left with
several possibilities.
First, for most of the CRSP era, investors may not have been aware of the existence of the
almost free lunch but given the attention in the academic and trade literature it has received,
investors will likely arbitrage away any future momentum prots. This is unlikely to be the
case. Momentum returns declined in the rst few years of the 21st century presumably due
to activities of hedge funds and other sophisticated investors who invested large amounts of
capital to capture prots from momentum like strategies. However, momentum strategies
have again become protable since 2006. Indeed, momentum prots appear to feature
periodic cycles. Figure 1 plots the time series of the Fama-French momentum factor returns
from January 1946 to May 2008 and the momentum factor returns during the Victorian
era - based on a new hand-collected data set introduced in this paper and described in
detail later. When we compare the Post-War data with the Victorian era we observe the
same cyclical pattern as well as momentum prots with roughly the same range of monthly
gains/losses - between 4 % and - 3%. The similarities are striking: Post-War momentum
prots as measured by the one year moving average of past Winners minus past Losers returns
exhibited 26 negative episodes (i.e., vanished) with an average duration of 4.1 months per
episode. During the period January 1867 to December 1907, momentum returns exhibited
31 negative episodes with an average duration of 3.8 months per episode 1 We would not
expect to see this pattern of vanishing and reemerging momentum prots if momentum
existed only because investors did not know about it.2 Instead, the time-series of CRSP and
historical era momentum prots resembles other rule-based trading strategies subject to the
1Grin, Ji and Martin (2004) have documented similar periodic declines in other nations as well.
2Figure 1 involves a one-year centered moving average. Hence, the moving average scheme produces some
induced temporal dependence. As will be discussed shortly, the temporal dependence in momentum prots
goes beyond that induced by smoothing.
1limits of arbitrage (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) - high average returns with enough
periodic declines to prevent sophisticated leveraged investors from capturing prots without
risk. For example, the decline in the protability of momentum strategies at the beginning
of this century appears to resemble periodic down cycles that have characterized momentum
strategy protability throughout the CRSP era.3
Second, the almost free lunch may not exist. That is, the apparent high returns may be
a spurious artifact of the data mining that is unlikely to show up in future data. While a
number of studies document the existence of price momentum in stocks in the United States
and other countries, almost all of these studies use data from the same post World War
II period and hence their ndings cannot be viewed as being entirely independent of each
other. We examine the returns on stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange during the
Victorian era and nd evidence the momentum existed outside of the CRSP era as well,
thereby ruling out such a possibility.
Third, the lunch may not be free. Momentum strategies may generate high returns on average
but expose investors to low returns during severe economic contractions. Such business cycle
risks may not be discernable by looking at the Post-War CRSP era data alone. If momentum
portfolios expose investors to occasional severe real risks at business cycle frequencies we may
need to observe returns in more than the handful of relatively benign Post-War cycles before
these risks become apparent. Historical Victorian age data helps us evaluate this hypothesis
by observing momentum returns across several business cycles of varying levels of severity.
Recessions were both more frequent and more severe during our Victorian era sample period.
The NBER business cycle chronology includes 10 troughs during the 42 years between 1866
and 1907 compared to 10 troughs in the 63 years since World War II.4 The cycles were more
severe as well. The standard deviation of annual per capita GDP growth was 4.5 % between
1866 and 1907 and 3 % between 1946 and 2007 (see Johnston and Williamson (2008)).
Finally, the lunch may be due to taxes, and vanish when tax laws change. For example,
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) examine the extent to which tax motivated trading can
account for some of the momentum phenomenon. They nd that the long run reversal of
momentum prots - i.e., the tendency of past Winners to lose relative to past Losers over
3Gatev, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst (2006) note that pairs trading - like momentum trading - features
periodic breaks as well. Hence, momentum trading; pairs trading; and the like { i.e. certain rules of forming
portfolios and liquidating portfolios { appear to work with random periodic breaks.
4We should mention that the NBER business cycle chronology is for the U.S. Since the U.K. and U.S.
business activities were highly correlated, we use the NBER Chronology.
236 to 60 months after portfolio formation - is largely conned to January, suggesting a link
to tax eects. It is dicult to untangle tax and behavioral explanations of momentum
using modern data. The British did not recognize capital gains as taxable income during
our sample period. Our nding that the time series pattern in momentum prots seen in
the post World War II data is also present during the Victorian age does not rule out an
accentuating role for modern tax motivated trading but it does suggest that price momentum
in stocks has a fundamental component that is unrelated to tax related trading activities of
investors.
Stock Price Momentum during the Victorian Age:
Cyclicality with Market States
To the extent decision making biases are hardwired into the human psyche, we should
expect to nd price momentum in stocks even during the second industrial revolution. The
London market during the Victorian age was, by today's standards a primitive market with
high execution costs, limited liquidity and very elementary computational power to sustain
complex trading strategies. Even today's emerging markets may look quite advanced in
comparison to 19th century London, at least the know-how of trading and nancial theory
have made big leaps forward compared to what was available more than 100 years ago.
Hence, if we do not nd relative price momentum in stocks during the Victorian age, that
would cast doubt upon the behavioral explanations that rely on the psychology of decision
making.
We use a new hand-collected data set of the London Stock Exchange.5 The new data set
consists of the closing prices, dividends and shares outstanding of 1,808 stocks (equity) listed
in London between 1866 and 1907. These stocks represent virtually every stock traded on
the London Stock Exchange during this period. The fact that the London Stock Exchange
was the most important market at the time, and that the U.K. was riding high on the waves
of the second industrial revolution makes this a particularly interesting era to study as we
cover a period of prosperity, expansion and the harbinger of twentieth century capitalism
and nancial markets.
5Historical data have been used before to assess some of the salient empirical stylized facts of asset returns.
Most of these studies have focused on issues such as long term predictability, see e.g. for NYSE from 1815
to 1925, as discussed in Goetzmann (1993) and Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng (2001) or the Brussels stock
exchange as discussed in Annaert and Van Hyfte (2006).
3The existence of price momentum during the Victorian age will not by itself rule out any
one class of theories, but does eliminate the possibility that price momentum may be an
artifact of data mining. Furthermore, to the extent that existing theories place out of sample
restrictions on historical data, we can use our 19th century sample to evaluate competing
hypotheses. We nd both statistically and economically signicant momentum eects { short
run reversal, medium term continuation, and long run reversal in past winners minus past
losers portfolio returns { and the order of magnitude is quite similar to that of the widely
documented end of 20th century evidence. However, we do not nd a particularly strong
relationship between momentum prots and rm size and we do not nd a distinct January
eect in our data.
Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) (hereafter CGH) note that the theory of DHS can
be extended to predict dierences in momentum prots across states of the market, like
bull and bear markets, as aggregate overcondence should be greater following market
gains. The HS model is also based on initial underreaction to information and subsequent
overreaction, which eventually leads to stock price reversal in the long run. Hence, CGH
test whether momentum prots depend on market states. They nd strong evidence that
CRSP era momentum prots depend on the state of the market, as predicted. Chordia and
Sivakumar (2002) [CS] show that macroeconomic instruments commonly used for measuring
macroeconomic conditions can explain a large portion of momentum prots. CS argue
that intertemporal variations in the macroeconomic risk factors are the main sources of
momentum prots. CGH overturn the CS results by examining the data in a dierent way.
We nd that similar patterns hold during the Victorian era as well, providing support of
CGH's ndings.
An important dening characteristic of momentum prots we nd is that momentum prots
are pro-cyclical with market states - momentum prots are high following high long run (36
months) market returns and low following low long run market returns { providing support
of CGH's. However, momentum prots are unrelated to economic expansion and contraction
cycles - and so the high returns to momentum strategies are dicult to reconcile as being
compensation for macroeconomic risk according to standard economic theory. That suggests
that "smart money, " i.e., the capital available to arbitrageurs, is in limited supply relative
to available investment opportunities created by "dumb money," i.e., capital available to
investors whose behavior is subject to behavioral biases documented in the literature. It
would appear that the limits of arbitrage discussed in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) may be
4particularly binding following up markets, an empirical regularity in the data spanning over
100 years.
A Brief Review of the Momentum Literature
In what follows we provide a selective survey of the literature, emphasizing only the ndings
relevant for the analysis in the current paper.6
Although several early empirical studies of the ecient market hypothesis examined relative
strength strategies, there was little consensus regarding the protability of such strategies.
Levy (1967) claimed that buying stocks when their prices are substantially higher than
their 27 weeks moving average resulted in superior prots. Jensen and Bennington (1970)
challenged this claim by showing that Levy's trading rules did no better than buy and
hold strategies suggesting that Levy's ndings could be subject to a data mining bias. In
contrast, Fisher Black (1973) found that Value Line rankings that relied, among other things,
on relative strength (of the stocks in the industry relative to the composite stock index)
had value. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) found that mutual fund managers exhibited a
tendency to buy past winners { their buy decisions appeared to rely on the existence of
price momentum. Lehmann (1990) used a clever portfolio strategy to exploit short run
reversal and showed that it is an economically interesting phenomenon. Lo and MacKinlay
(1990) examined the sources of momentum prots by analyzing Lehmann's (1990) portfolio
strategy.7
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) designed a clever trading strategy that we follow in this
paper. Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) strategy relied on relative price momentum that
was well dened and has been replicated by other researchers.8 A vast number of studies
have conrmed the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) nding using data from markets in a
number of countries { United States, Europe, and emerging economies (see e.g. Rouwenhorst
(1998)).9 Using a sample from 1973 until February 2008, Asness et al. (2008) study
(value and) momentum in ve major asset classes: (i) stock selection within four major
countries, (ii) country equity index selection, (iii) government bond selection, (iv) currency
selection, and (v) commodities. They provide ubiquitous evidence on the excess return
6For a recent comprehensive survey of the literature, see e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (2005).
7See Jegadeesh and Titman (2005) for a comprehensive survey of the momentum literature.
8Jegadeesh (1990) showed short term reversal and medium term continuation in returns in the cross
section using regression methods.
9Chui, Titman, and Wei (2007) note that Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are exceptions.
5to value and momentum, extending the existing evidence to government bonds, currencies
and commodities. The consensus appears to be that there is reversal in the short run {
i.e., past Winners lose relative to past Losers during the rst month following portfolio
formation; continuation during the intermediate term { i.e., past Winners continue to win
relative to past Losers during the 2 to 12 months following portfolio formation; and long
run reversal - i.e., past Winners lose relative to past Losers over 36 to 60 months following
portfolio formation. The evidence is stronger for short term reversal and intermediate term
continuation. Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) show that momentum prots cannot be explained
away by transactions costs. Given their estimates of visible and invisible transactions costs,
nd that the abnormal returns to some of the momentum strategies disappear only after
about $ 5 billion of money chases them.
A variety of explanations are oered for these relations. They range from data issues, such as
microstructure and data snooping biases (Boudoukh et al. (1994), Conrad and Kaul (1989),
Lo and MacKinlay (1988), to rational risk-based explanations (Conrad and Kaul (1998) Berk
et al. (1999), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Bansal et al. (2002), to irrational behavioral
stories (DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Daniel et al. (1998),
Barberis et al. (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), Hong et al. (2000), Lee and Swaminathan
(2000), Grinblatt and Han (2002), among others.
Several theories have been advanced to explain this phenomenon. They can be put into two
classes: those that rely on investor psychology aecting stock prices and others that rely on
the changing nature of real investment options available to rms. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (1997) (henceforth DHS), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) (henceforth
BSV), Hong and Stein (1999) (hereafter HS) and Grinblatt and Han (2005) (henceforth
GH)are some of the notable papers falling in the former class. DHS assume overcondence
and self attribution - leads to momentum from overreaction that subsequently corrects
resulting in reversal. BSV assume conservatism and extrapolation on the part of investors
and show that will lead to continuation in the intermediate term and reversal in the long
run. Hong and Stein assume slow information diusion and positive feedback trading and
show it can lead to momentum and subsequent reversal. GH argue that the tendency of
some investors to hold on to their losing stocks, driven by prospect theory" of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) "and mental accounting" of Thaler (1980) can lead to slower diusion
of information and price momentum in stocks. The commonality among all these models is
they all rely on biases in how investors process information.
6Berk, Green and Naik (1999) (BGN), Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004), Johnson
(2002), Chen and Zhang (2007), and Sagi and Seasholes (2007) fall in the latter class. BGN
pioneered the latter line of thinking by showing that when rms make optimal investment
choices, their assets and investment options change in a predictable way aecting their life
cycle risk characteristics and that can also cause price momentum in stocks.
Rest of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start in section 2 with details of
the historical data set we collected. In section 3 we discuss the empirical ndings regarding
momentum. Section 4 reports some measures of trading costs for the London market. Section
5 studies the dependence of momentum prots on market states, while Section 6 examines
the dependence of momentum prots on the state of the economy. Section 7 analyzes the
term structure of momentum prots, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 The London Stock Market Data: 1866-1907
This study makes use of a new data set consisting of the closing prices, dividends and shares
outstanding of 1,808 stocks (equity) listed in London between 1866 and 1907, compiled by
the authors from late 19th and early 20th Century nancial publications. As can be seen
from Figure 2, the number of stocks we use to form momentum portfolios, varies from 126
in 1866 to 1074 in 1907. The number of stocks declines from 985 in 1903 to 544 in 1904, due
to a number of industries vanishing from the quotation list, only to reappear in 1905.
The closing bid and ask prices were collected from the quotation list of The Money Market
Review, a weekly nancial paper published in London between 1860 and 1908. Published on
Saturdays, The Money Market Review reprinted H.H. Wetenhall's ocial quotation list of the
previous Friday's closing prices. These were the ocial prices published by the Committee
of the Stock Exchange under the name \Course of the Exchange". The data was sampled
every 28-days rather then the more traditional end of month observations, due to the weekly
publication schedule.
The ocial list was organized by industry and asset type. The list begins with British
government debt, then lists foreign government debt, British, Commonwealth and foreign
7railroads and concludes with commercial securities organized by industry (banks, breweries,
canals & docks, insurance, iron coal & steel, gas, mining, shipping, spinning, waterworks,
tea, land, nancial & investment trusts and miscellaneous securities). The Money Market
Review's list is not complete. Some industries do not appear on certain dates and within
industries individual stocks may have no price for one or more dates. When possible,
we lled in the missing price data with The Economist's \Stock Market Prices Current".
The Economist published weekly economic statistics and a \Stock Market Prices Current"
throughout our period of study. The Economist's price list included only the largest and
most active securities listed in London. Since the coverage was sparse, we only employ the
Economist to ll in data that was missing from the The Money Market Review. If a section
of the ocial list was omitted from a given Money Market Review, we attempted to replace
the missing data with quotes from the Economist.
The data set contains 610,421 bid and ask prices. To minimize entry time and assure quality,
the data was double entered by undergraduate research assistants. As a consequence of our
data entry strategy, a stock must appear on the ocial list for at least one January before
it is included in the data set.
The ocial lists did not dierentiate between equity and debt. Today, one would assume
that an economist and trained historian would have no problem distinguishing a stock from
a bond, but in the 19th Century the dierence between debt and equity was seldom obvious.
The 19th Century English publications generally referred to both debt and equity claims
as \stocks". A careful examination of the claims each class of shareholder enjoyed, usually
allowed us to determine if a given security was a debt or equity claim. When selecting which
securities to include in our data set, we excluded all securities with xed interest rates, a
face value to be returned at a maturity date or other obvious characteristics of bonds.
In general, London securities were divided into the following types of asset classes: \stocks",
\shares", \ordinary", \common", \limited", \deferred", \preference", \debenture" and
\convertible" shares. Whether, the name of the share corresponded to what a modern
investor would consider equity depended upon the type of company in question. We looked
at each potential security and excluded every security with characteristics similar to modern
day debt. \Common", \limited", and \ordinary" shares were almost always the residual
claimants and therefore correspond to modern day equity. \Stock" on
the other hand, was the name given to 19th Century bonds! \Preference", \debenture"
8and \convertible" shares were also excluded, while \deferred" shares generally referred to
debt oerings with one notable exception, the investment trusts. Many investment trusts
issued only three types of shares, \preference", \debenture" and \deferred". Debenture and
preference shares had a xed dividend rate and often had a maturity date at which time the
nominal amount (face value) of the share would be returned. Deferred shares in investment
trusts, on the other hand, were generally the residual claimant to all income in excess of the
debenture and preference obligations. We include the deferred shares of investment trusts
in our data, provided the trust has no ordinary shares and the deferred shares satisfy our
conditions of no maturity date and no cap on dividends.
For each January, a list of all securities was compiled, meeting our denition of equity. This
list of security names and copies of the subsequent year's quotation lists, were distributed to
research assistants. To eliminate typos each date was double entered by dierent research
assistants and then compared. Therefore, to appear in the data set, a stock had to appear
on the ocial quotation list for at least one January.
In addition to the closing prices, we collected dividend payments and shares outstanding,
for each security. These allow us to compute market values and 28-day holding period
returns, that accurately reect dividend payments and stock splits. In total, the data set
consists of 610,421 bid and ask prices and 39,090 dividend payments. The dividend payments
were collected from the security lists of The Investor's Monthly Manual.10. The Investor's
Monthly Manual (IMM) published the monthly closing price, shares outstanding and last
four dividends of each security, listed on the London Stock Exchange. We use the IMM to
collect dividend and share histories for each security that appears in our data set. Like The
Money Market Review, certain securities vanish from the IMM and reappear at a later date
without explanation.
Capital Calls and Returns
We use the price and dividend data to compute the 28-day holding period return for
each consecutive price observation. The 28-day holding period gross return is dened as
(Pt+1+dt+1)=Pt where Pt+1 and Pt are the average of the bid and ask prices at time t+1 and
t respectively, and dt+1 is the net dividend payments and capital calls (if any) that occurred
10The IMM is available online at http://som.yale.edu/imm/html/index.shtml
9between time t and t + 1 . Capital calls are a form of reverse dividend common to 19th
Century stock exchanges.
Many 19th Century companies issued shares with a nominal value known as the \amount".
The company typically did not require the shareholders to pay for the entire share at the
time of issue. Instead, shares were issued with a \par" or \paid" value that was less than the
nominal amount of the share. Dividends were based on the par value of the share and not the
nominal amount. For example, if a company with a $100 share with $50 paid announced a
10% declared dividend, this would amount to $5 rather than $10:
The shareholder was legally obligated to pay the remaining capital (the dierence between
the nominal and paid amount) at the whim of the company. Thus the company could
\call" upon its shareholders to pay for the remaining value of their shares. This call was
apparently binding, as the shares in many bankrupt companies with par values less than
nominal amounts traded at negative values when the implicit short put option embedded in
the shares was worth more than the company's equity.11 To compute holding period returns,
we treat capital calls as a negative dividend paid at the beginning of the holding period.
Data Limitations
Historical data provides both a new laboratory to evaluate theories as well as a unique set
of challenges. Missing observations are far more common in historical data. There are three
types of missing data. Firstly, there are securities that vanish because the company goes
out of business. Secondly, there are securities that are not quoted for a period and then
re-appear without explanation. Finally, there are dates when the newspapers omit an entire
industry from the price lists.
The rst case is the well known problem of survivorship bias. Securities do not vanish from
the price list at random. Instead, the companies with poor returns and low stock prices
are far more likely to go bankrupt and vanish. Two characteristics of our data mitigate the
potential survivorship bias. To begin with, very few securities simply \vanish". When a
security disappears from our price list we generally observe its decline to zero (or negative)
price before it is removed from the list. When a security vanishes we make every attempt
to discover what happened to the company and compute the nal holding period return. If
11We only include stocks with positive values in the analysis that follows.
10the security vanished due to reorganization, liquidation or merger, the IMM often lists the
details and we correct the last return to reect these events.
The second and third cases of missing data are more troublesome. These are cases of
securities that do not go out of business, but are merely omitted from the price list on
a given day. If prices are missing completely at random, the analysis that follows can easily
be altered to accommodate the missing observations. If the probability of observing a given
return is correlated with the value of that return, however, the missing values will bias our
estimates.
In the computations to follow, we form our momentum portfolios using actual prices available
to Victorian era investors. We base all buy and sell decisions on actual price data. Once a
portfolio is formed, however, we compute its post-formation return from observable prices if
possible and interpolate data if necessary.
When necessary, we replace missing prices with interpolated data via the following algorithm.
If a security vanishes from the quotation list we look ahead to the next date that a quotation
is available. If the security reappears N-periods in the future, we compute the N-period
gross return and convert it to a 1-period return by taking the gross return to the (1/N)th
power. We replace all missing 1-period returns with this interpolated return. For example, if
a security's price is last observed at time t and reappears 20% higher at time t+5 we replace
the missing values at time t+1 to t+5 with (1:2)(1=5): When computing multiperiod returns
we assume all dividends are paid at the end of the period.
If a stock vanishes and does not reappear for one year we set its return to -99.99 %. Setting
all extinct stocks to -99.99 % return surely understates the true return. However, the nature
of the conclusions we obtain do not change if we relax our assumptions by either ignoring the
extinction (don't set the last return to -99.99%) or ignoring all missing data by assuming it is
missing at random and computing results from observable data only. Setting extinct stocks
to -99.99% obviously lowers gross returns but the relative comparisons of portfolios sorted
by size or momentum are robust to the treatment of missing data - as will be discussed in
detail later.
Finally, it should be noted that we do not have enough industries during the Victorian
age, which prevents us from examining the importance of industry momentum identied by
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999).
113 Intermediate Term Momentum in Stock Prices
The structure of this section follows that of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), henceforth referred
to as JT. It is worth recalling the trading strategies considered by JT. The main motivation is
the premise that if stock prices either overreact or underreact to information, then protable
trading strategies that select stocks based on their past returns will exist. Therefore strategies
examined by JT, consider selecting stocks based on their returns over the past 1 through 4
quarters. To increase the power of the tests, the strategies include portfolios with overlapping
holding periods. Therefore, in any given month t, the strategies hold a series of portfolios
that are selected in the current month as well as in the previous K - 1 months, where K is the
holding period.12 Specically, a strategy that selects stocks on the basis of returns over the
past J months and holds them for K months is referred to as a J-month/K-month strategy.
It is constructed as follows: At the beginning of each month t the securities are ranked in
ascending order on the basis of their returns in the past J months. Based on these rankings,
JT grouped stocks into deciles and formed a value-weighted portfolio of stocks within each
decile. Since the number of stocks available to us during the Victorian age is smaller, we
will work with a coarser grid, namely top, middle and bottom thirds - or small, medium
and large. The top portfolio is called the \losers"and the bottom is called the \winners".
In each month t, the strategy buys the winner portfolio and sells the loser portfolio, holding
this position for K months.13
Let us recall that JT used constructed momentum portfolio returns over the 1965 to 1989
period using data from the CRSP daily returns le. All stocks with available returns data
in the J months preceding the portfolio formation date are included in the sample from
which the buy and sell portfolios are constructed. Table 1, similar to Table I in JT, reports
the average returns of the dierent buy and sell portfolios as well as the zero-cost, winners
minus losers, portfolios constructed using our data set. JT have a larger set of 32 strategies,
while our selection strategy is constrained by the smaller set of stocks and less frequent
trading. JT nd that the returns of all the zero-cost portfolios are positive and statistically
signicant except for the 3-month/3-month strategy. Our historical results reported in Table
1 are the same. The weakest case is the 3/3 strategy, which is not statistically signicant.
12As noted at the beginning of section 2, we considered 28-day periods as months in our calculations.
Moreover, when considering a year, i.e. K = 12 months in JT, we used 13 28-day periods.
13As mentioned earlier, if a stock, included in a momentum portfolio, vanishes from the database when
the portfolio is formed, but does not reappear at any future point in time, we remove it. When a stock does
reappear at a latter time, we interpolate its price in computing the return on the momentum portfolio.
12The most successful zero-cost strategy in JT is the J=12/K=3 months strategy which yields
1.31 % per month. Our most protable strategies are also of the same type (J=13/K=3
and J=9/K=6 being quite similar) although they yield only .5 % per month. Moreover,
the 9-month formation period produces returns of about .5 % per month regardless of the
holding period. This is to be expected since we use a coarser partition of stocks based on
past returns (tertile instead of decile as in JT). While the order of magnitude of monthly
returns is less than half that reported in the JT paper, the statistical signicance is about
the same.
To assess whether momentum strategy prots are abnormally high, it is necessary to examine
their exposure to systematic risk. We follow the JT approach in focusing all our remaining
analysis on the 6-month/6-month strategy, and thus in the rest of this paper the length of a
period is 6 months. This has the advantage that we are dealing with equally spaced return
observations, which makes the analysis of factor models and temporal dependence easier.
Table 2 reports estimates of the two most common indicators of systematic risk, the
post-ranking betas of the 6-month/6-month relative strength portfolios and the average
capitalizations of the stocks in these portfolios. The table is similar to Table 2 in JT, except
for the fact that we have less entries due to the smaller set of strategies considered. We nd,
(similar to JT) that the beta of the zero-cost winners minus losers portfolio is negative (we
nd a beta of -0.02, whereas JT have a beta of -0.08), since the beta of the portfolio of past
losers is higher than that of the portfolio of past winners. The average capitalizations of the
stocks in the dierent portfolios show that the highest and the lowest past returns portfolios
consist of smaller than average stocks, with the stocks in the losers portfolios being smaller
than the stocks in the winners portfolio. This evidence is consistent with JT, suggesting
positive risk adjusted returns on average, for the momentum portfolio.
Next, we examine the protability of the 6-month/6-month strategy within subsamples
stratied on the basis of rm size. Size is sorted in lower, middle and highest thirds. Panel A
of Table 3 reports average returns and Jensen's CAPM alphas, and Panel B reports CAPM
regressions augmented with a NBER Business Cycle dummy.14
14Consensus U.K. business cycle dates are not available for this time period. Therefore, we use NBER
business cycle dates as proxies for the trans-Atlantic business cycle. However, there is considerable evidence
that the U.S. and U.K business cycle was correlated during the Victorian era. U.S. and U.K. industrial
production and per capita GDP had correlations of .22 and .25 respectively. Historical consumption data is
unavailable but average U.K. household earnings grew at a rate of 1.55 % in years without NBER contractions
and 1 % in years with an NBER contraction. See Ocer (2008 a,b).
13We note in Panel A of Table 3 that all the CAPM alphas are negative. A robustness check
reported in Table 4 shows that this is due to our treatment of missing data. Recall that
we set the last monthly return to -99.99 % whenever a rm vanishes from our sample after
portfolio formation. This grossly understates the actual returns. In Table 4 we compute
returns under the alternative assumption that rms leave the database at random and do
not set the last monthly return to -99.99%. This alternative method ignores the survivorship
issue, as is done in JT. Under the alternative treatment of missing data half the portfolios
have positive alphas and half have negative alphas - as is found with modern era data. Thus
we can be condent that the negative CAPM alphas are due to our treatment of missing
data.
As JT note, measuring relative strength prots on size-based subsamples allows us to examine
whether the protability of the strategy is conned to any particular subsample of stocks.
This analysis also provides additional evidence about the source of the observed relative
strength prots. Table 3 presents the average returns of the 6-month/6-month strategy for
each of the subsamples. The results we report are in line with JT. They indicate that the
observed abnormal returns are of approximately the same magnitude when the strategies
are implemented on the various subsamples of stocks as when they are implemented on the
entire sample. Unlike JT we do not nd a particularly strong relationship with rm size. For
the zero-cost, winners minus losers portfolio, JT nd that the subsample with the largest
rms generates lower abnormal returns than the other two subsamples. In Table 3 we nd
a large return for the medium-sized category, although the large rms in our sample still
create the lowest return for the zero-cost, winners minus losers portfolio. When we control
for the business cycle, we obtain similar ndings, as discussed later. These ndings indicate
that the relative strength prots are not primarily due to the cross-sectional dierences in
the systematic risk of the stocks in the sample.
Likewise, Table 6 reports the average returns of the zero-cost portfolio in January versus the
rest of the year. JT note that following Roll (1983), there are reasons to expect that the
relative strength strategies will not be successful in the month of January. They nd that
relative strength strategy loses about 7 % on average in each January but achieves positive
abnormal returns in each of the other months. We do not nd such seasonal patterns, namely
the month of January does not yield negative returns in our sample. Moreover, according
to statistical tests reported in Table 6 there is, with a few minor exceptions, basically no
dierence between January and the other months of the year. Our ndings essentially conrm
14the Roll (1983) story. With no capital gain taxes in our time period we do not expect a
January eect, as predicted by Roll (1983).
To conclude, we examine again whether our choice of missing data treatment alter the results
of the paper. In Table 5 we report the results we obtain for size-sorted average monthly
returns and t-statistics for buy minus sell portfolios under our treatment of missing data
and results we would obtain if we relaxed our assumptions by either ignoring the extinction
(don't set the last return to -99.99%) or ignoring all missing data by assuming it is missing
completely at random (MCAR) and computing results from observable data only. Setting
extinct stocks to -99.99% obviously lowers gross returns but the relative comparisons of
portfolios sorted by size or momentum are robust to the treatment of missing data. The
t-stats are signicant under all treatments of missing data. The results in Table 5 show that
our decision to replace missing with -99.99% is in fact the most conservative. Moreover, the
probability that a rm vanishes appears to be largely independent of past returns. While
the actual magnitude of winner and loser alphas depend on the treatment of missing data
the alpha generated from a long winner short loser portfolio is robust to assumptions about
missing rm returns.
4 Trading Costs
In Tables 7 and 8 we turn our attention to transaction costs. It is indeed worth investigating
how costly it would be to sustain a momentum strategy. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou
(2004) examine the protability of momentum trading strategies and nd that those stocks
that generate large momentum returns are precisely the stocks with high trading costs.
Along similar lines, Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) test whether momentum strategies remain
protable after considering market frictions induced by trading. Both studies use data, such
as intraday data, which is not available in our historical period. We therefore use a simpler
approach to gauge the importance of trading costs associated with momentum portfolios.
Table 8 provides data on average bid-ask spreads and average prices of stocks in each of
the portfolio categories, whereas Table 7 displays the transition probabilities pertaining to
portfolio turnover. Regarding the latter, each cell in the matrix contains the proportion of
times that a stock in a given portfolio at time t lands in a given portfolio at time t + 1:
With respect to trading costs we are most interested in the diagonal values which tell us
15the proportion of times a stock remains in the same portfolio during a new formation.
The persistence of stock assignment is generally in the 30-35 % range, which is fairly high
compared to current momentum strategies (see e.g. Conrad and Kaul (1998)).
Table 8 also reports the value-weighted bid-ask spread as a percentage of the midpoint for
all stocks that are assigned to each portfolio at each date. For example, when the Large Buy
portfolio's spread is .02, it means that the value-weighted average bid-ask spread of all stocks
purchased or sold from the Large Buy portfolio was 2 % of the midpoint of their bid-ask
price. To get an idea of transaction costs, it should be noted that the average bid-ask spread
of the Large Buy portfolio was .02. We know that only 1/6 of the portfolio is replaced each
period so dividing by 6 .02/6 = .0033. This is the average per period transaction cost if one
paid the full bid-ask spread and bought and sold every stock in the new and old portfolios.
However, some of the stocks in the new portfolio were also in the portfolio we formed 6
months ago. From the transition matrix in Table 6 we see that on average 32 % of the stocks
in the Large Buy portfolio at any time are also in the same portfolio 6 months later. We
would therefore only have to turn over 68 % of the stocks. Multiply .0033 by .68 to get the
nal back of the envelope estimate of bid-ask costs of roughly 23 basis points per period.
This turns out to be the lowest cost. For the other portfolios the costs can be as high as 229
basis points (Small Loser). Hence, these rough measures show that trading costs are high,
at least as much as they are in recent history, which makes the prots of momentum not
realizable except possibly to those who were making a market in those stocks.
5 Market States and Momentum
Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) note that the theory of DHS can be extended
to predict dierences in momentum prots across states of the market, like bull and
bear markets, as aggregate overcondence should be greater following market gains (DHS
and Gervais and Odean (2001)). With overcondence higher following market increases,
overreactions will be stronger following up markets, generating greater momentum in the
short run. The HS model is also based on initial underreaction to information and subsequent
overreaction, which eventually leads to stock price reversal in the long run.
In Table 9 we report the evidence of momentum and market states in our sample. For
each month, between 1929 and 1995, CGH dene the state of the market as Up (Down) if
16the markets trailing three-year return is positive (negative) on that date. They compare
the returns of momentum portfolios formed during Up and Down markets and conclude
that momentum was largely an up market phenomenon during the CRSP era. The London
market index was seldom down in the 3-year windows during our historical sample period.
We therefore take a slightly dierent denition of up and down markets. By CGH0s denition,
85 % of their observed market states were UP markets. We dene Victorian market states as
follows Up = market index return over the past 3 years in the top 85 % of sample returns, and
Down = market index return over the past 3 years in the bottom 15 % of sample returns. We
include a panel in Table 9 that contains the CRSP era results with the our sorting method
over CGH0s sample years, because CGH sort stocks into deciles while we sort into terciles.
The choice of tercile sorts instead of deciles, weakens the relationship between market state
and momentum in the CRSP era but the dierence between UP and DOWN market states,
remains.
Average prots and risk adjusted returns by market state are computed by taking the prots
of each zero-cost momentum portfolio (winner minus loser terciles) for each formation date
and averaging across all formation dates that qualify for a particular market state. The





where rk is the return of the 6-6 winner minus loser momentum portfolio formed at time t.
We follow CGH and also report the average CAPM alpha across market states. The CAPM




rk   b t(rm;k   rf;k)]=6 (5.2)
where b t is the OLS estimator of a CAPM regression, using data from t + 1 to t + 6:
Table 9 reports the mean monthly prots and mean CAPM alphas by market state. The
Up market average monthly prot is computed by taking the average of all AvgRETt for
formation time t that corresponds to an Up market state. Down market results are computed
in the same manner. Since the average returns are computed from overlapping holding
periods, all t-stats are computed with the Newey and West (1987) HAC procedure using 5
17lags.
CGH nd that momentum prots depend on the state of the market, as predicted. From
1929 to 1995, the mean monthly momentum prot following positive market returns is 0.93
% in their sample, whereas the mean prot following negative market returns is - 0.37 %.
The up-market momentum reverses in the long run.
In Table 9 for the 6/6 winner minus loser portfolio, we nd that the average monthly return
following an Up market is 40 bp per month in the CRSP sample, and 38 bp per month in our
sample. The corresponding numbers following a Down market are -28 bp per month and 15
bp per month respectively. Clearly, momentum prots are higher following Up markets than
Down markets in our sample just like in the CRSP sample, using our rule for classifying Up
and Down markets. While the dierence is statistically signicant in the CRSP sample, it
is not signicant in our sample. We also nd similar patterns for Jensen's alpha.
Next we examine whether commonly used macroeconomic instruments for measuring market
conditions can explain a large portion of momentum prots, following the methods used in
CGH. Following Chordia and Sivakumar (2002) we construct a factor model for expected
returns:
rt = a + b1Mktt + b2Divyldt + b3Termt + b4Defaultt (5.3)
where the return on the 6-6 momentum portfolio (i.e., Winner minus Loser monthly rate of
return) is projected onto Divyldt: lagged dividend yield on the market index, Termt: lagged
term spread [yield on British consol - yield on 30-day bankbill], and Defaultt: lagged default
spread [yield on risky bonds (portfolio of British RR bonds) - yield on British consol].15
We use two methods to evaluate the ability of the factors to explain momentum prots. In
Panel A of Table 10 we report the slope coecients, the test statistic for the hypothesis that
b2 = b3 = b4 =0 and the proportion of variation collectively explained by the Divyld; Term
and Default factors. The latter is obtained via the R2 of the CAPM residuals regressed on
Divyld; Term and Default: For most 6-6 momentum portfolios we can soundly reject the
null, that the betas on the macroeconomic factors are collectively equal to zero. It should be
noted that CS use a 3 factor model with no market index. We add the market index for the
regression that reports factor loadings and proportion of extra variation explained by CS's
3 factors (panel A of Table 10). In Panel B of Table 10 we sort on CS's three factors model
15 We computed the yields on the British consol and British railroad bonds from quotations in the Course
of the Exchange. The yield on 30-day bank bills was collected from The Economist.
18(no market index). However, the proportion of variation explained by the macro factors
is extremely small. Collectively the macro factors explain less than 3 % of the time series
variation in portfolio returns and in the case of the largest stocks less than 0.3 %.
CGH employ a clever double sort methodology to illustrate the relative inuence of
momentum and factor premium on portfolio returns. For each stock and time period, they
compute the factor loadings via an OLS regression over the trailing 60 months. With time t
beta estimates in hand, they compute the expected return of each stock over the future
6 months given current betas and actual future realizations of the factors. They then
sort stocks into portfolios based on momentum and factor model expected return. This
is equivalent to the double sorts we report in our Table 3, using factor model expected
returns in place of size. We form historical portfolios via this method and report the
results in Panel B of Table 10. We see that Winner minus Loser portfolios within each
of the three predicted return categories earn positive returns on average; the average returns
are statistically (t=3.75) and economically (54 bp per month) signicant within the high
predicted returns group. Further, within the Loser and Middle groups, stocks with high
predicted returns earn lower returns than stocks with low expected returns, and they are
jointly signicantly dierent from zero. Hence, the ndings with Victorian era data, support
the results of CGH, although our evidence appears somewhat weaker.
6 Business Cycles and Momentum Prots
During the Victorian age there were at least as many business cycles as in the current
CRSP data; and the depressions of those days have been characterized as more severe.16 We
therefore examine how momentum prots are related to business conditions (expansions and
contractions; as well as past stock market returns). To do so we turn our attention now to
Tables 11 and 12. In Table 11 we report the results of the regression:
r = a + b1  (Mkt) + b2  (GDP)
where r is the return on buy portfolio minus the return on sell portfolio and GDP is the
demeaned real per capita GDP growth. We examine this regression for small, medium and
large stocks. In none of the cases do we observe any signicantly positive exposure of the
16There were 10 NBER recessions between 1866 and 1907 and 10 between 1946 and the present.
19momentum prots to GDP growth rate risk; in fact the point estimates of the slope coecient
for GDP growth rate is negative for all size classes.
To complement this, we also report in Table 12 a correlation matrix for the following
variables: real per capita GDP growth, buy-sell portfolio annual returns for small, medium
and large stocks, the average cross-sectional monthly stock return standard deviation, market
excess returns and UK short and long-term rates obtained from Ordinary Funds. The
correlations are computed using annual data. The rst column of Table 12 shows that the
annual returns of the buy-sell portfolio for small stocks features very negative correlations
with GDP growth (around 30 %), as well as the excess market returns and the long term
rate. The medium-sized rms feature similar negative correlations except for the long rate
which is positively correlated with buy-sell portfolio annual returns for medium rms (more
than 35 %). Finally, the Buy-sell portfolio annual returns for large rms also show negative
correlation with GDP growth, although the correlation monotonically declines with the size
of the rms.
7 Term structure of momentum returns
Momentum prots can occur for a variety of reasons even from the perspective of some
one who subscribes to the behavioral point of view. For example, if momentum prots are
entirely due to slow diusion of information, then the positive abnormal returns should decay
over time to zero. On the other hand, if momentum prots are due to delayed overreaction,
momentum prots will likely reverse in sign before decaying down to zero over time. We
therefore examine the term structure of the prots to the various momentum portfolios in
this section.
We report in Table 13 the average monthly excess return on the momentum portfolios during
each of the ve years following portfolio formation, after skipping a month.17 The loser
portfolios' returns almost double from year 1 to year 5. In contrast, the winner portfolios'
returns come down somewhat by year 5. Therefore the dierence, i.e., the winner minus loser
17It is important to note that the results in Table 13 are computed from all available time periods. This
means the sample periods vary by column. For example the portfolio return in year 2 after formation is
computed by looking at the buy-sell portfolio 14-26 months after formation, so our rst "year 2" observation
is July 1867-June 1868. Our rst "year 5" observation doesn't begin until July 1871, however. Therefore
the Year 2 column has more observations than the Year 5 column. This is also why the various columns do
not add up.
20momentum portfolio returns becomes negative in years 4 and 5, and marginally signicant.
As can be seen from Figure 4, a dollar invested in the 6 month Winner portfolio can be
expected to grow steadily over time to 1.15 dollars in 5 years; and a dollar invested in the
6 month Loser portfolio can be expected to decline to 0.99 dollars after 19 months before
rising to 1.08 dollars at the end of 5 years. The dierence between the value of a dollar
invested in each of the Winner and the Loser portfolios peaked at 7.7 cents on average by
the end of the 3rd year before narrowing down to 6.1 cents at the end of 5 years (see Figure
5). So, while the evidence of long run reversal exists, it is not as dramatic as that reported in
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)we can reject the hypothesis that momentum returns in years
2 to 5 are the same as that during year 1, in favor of the alternative that they are smaller
at conventional levels of signicance.
Since our historical data is sampled every 28-days, therefore one year is 13 \months". We
wish to test the null hypothesis that the winner minus looser (WML) portfolio exhibits no
momentum or reversal. We begin by forming a T  N matrix X where the (t   th;n   th)
element is equal to the month t annual return on the WML portfolio formed n years earlier.
Let X(t;n) be the holding period return from month (t   12) to month t on the WML
portfolio formed n  13 \months"earlier. Under the null hypothesis that WML returns are
independent of time since formation, each column of X should have the same expectation.
We test this hypothesis by subtracting the year 1 WML return from the year 2, 3, 4 and
5 returns to form a new ~ X matrix, such that ~ X(t;n)  (X(t;n + 1) - X(t;1)): Therefore
~ X(t;n) measures the dierence between the holding period return from month (t   12) to
month t on the WML portfolio formed (n + 1) years earlier and the WML portfolio formed
1 year earlier. Under the null hypothesis of no momentum or reversal ~ X(t;n) should have
expectation zero. Table 14 reports the mean return of the WML portfolio 1 through 5 years
after formation. We test of the null that E[ ~ X(t;n)] = 0 8 t and n: via a Wald test.18 The
results in Table 14 show strong rejections of the null that average monthly returns are equal
in years 1 through 5. It is interesting to note the pattern of mean returns: 0.0034 after one
year, 0.0016, 0.0006 after two and three years and nally -0.0006 and -0.0015 after years four
and ve. This rearms the nding of short run reversal, medium term continuation, and
long run reversal in past winners minus past losers portfolio returns.
The lower panel of the Table shows some pairwise test results and we note that year 1 is




t[ ~ X(t;4)]=T); then the test statistic is W =
gCov(g) 1g; where under the null W  2(4); asymptotically. Since the elements of ~ X are serially correlated,
we use a HAC estimator for Cov(g) using Newey-West with 13 lags.
21signicantly dierent from all other years. The average monthly returns after 2 and 3 years
appear to have the same mean, and so do years 3 and 4 as well as 4 and 5.
It should be noted that the above test may be biased by missing data. In particular, when
an asset vanishes from our data set we set its return to -99.9% at the time of extinction
and replace missing data with interpolated data when possible. However, we veried that
the momentum in years 1 and 2 and reversal in years 4 and 5 are robust to missing data
treatment, and we nd indeed they are.19
8 Conclusion
We use a new hand-collected data set of the London Stock Exchange which consists of the
closing prices, dividends and shares outstanding of 1,808 stocks (equity) listed between 1866
and 1907. By today's standard, the market was very primitive - and therefore presented an
interesting case to examine price momentum.
We replicate the trading strategy designed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and nd
compelling evidence for short term reversal, intermediate term continuation and long run
reversal in momentum prots. We also nd that momentum prots are higher following
up markets when compared to down markets. Further, momentum prots do not appear
to be compensation for economy wide systematic risk, captured by the standard CAPM or
macroeconomic factor models. Momentum prots are higher during economic contractions,
a pattern that is dierent from the post World War II period. That poses a challenge rational
models of investor behavior that have been proposed in the literature as an explanation of
the momentum phenomenon. Also, 0ur nding of price momentum during the Victorian age
eliminates the possibility that price momentum may be an artifact of data mining.
We nd that momentum prots are low following three year down markets and high following
three year up markets. That is the systematic pattern across data spanning several centuries.
The dening characteristics of momentum { its cyclicality { is not related to aggregate
19We did this as follows. If survival rates dier across buy and sell portfolios this may bias our reversal tests.
We evaluate the eect of missing data on the results in two ways. First we simply compute the probability
of extinction. If the probability of extinction is independent of past return the momentum results should
be robust to our choice of missing data treatment. We nd survival probabilities that a stock remains in
the data set, n-months after formation, for buy and sell portfolios. The dierence between survival rates in
buy and sell portfolios is very small. We also computed the event time returns of WML portfolios under our
treatment of missing data and an alternative treatment that simply ignores securities that vanish.
22consumption or GDP numbers, but what happens to the stock market. The theoretical
literature emphasizes the role of "dumb money" and "limits of arbitrage" in explaining price
momentum in stocks. Our ndings suggest that "dumb money" may be abundant relative to
"smart money" following up markets, and regulators interested in the stability of nancial
system may have to be especially watchful during up markets, lest the "dumb money" eect
takes over and exerts major inuence over economic activities.
Finally, our nding that price momentum in stocks during the Victorian age when there
was no capital gains taxation suggests that the long run reversal of momentum prots must
have a fundamental component identied by Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) using CRSP
era data, that is unrelated to tax-based trading.
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28Table 1: Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios - Short horizons
The relative strength portfolios are formed on J-month lagged returns and held for K months. The values
of J and K for the dierent strategies are indicated in the rst column and row respectively. The stocks
are ranked in ascending order on the basis of J-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks
in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the
highest 67th percentile past return decile is the buy portfolio. t-statistics are between parentheses. As noted
at the beginning of section 2, we considered 28-day periods as months in our calculations. Moreover, when
considering a year, i.e. K = 12 in Jegadeesh and Titman, we used 13 28-day periods.
K = 3 6 9 1 YR
J
3 Buy 0.0001 0.0016 0.0019 0.0023
(0.002) (1.4428) (1.8167) (2.4009)
3 Sell 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (-0.2643) (0.0389) (0.1415)
3 Buy-sell 0.0001 0.0019 0.0018 0.0022
(0.0019) (1.8938) (2.1452) (3.0538)
6 Buy 0.0018 0.0026 0.0030 0.0032
(1.5419) (2.306) (2.8644) (3.267)
6 Sell -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 0.0000
(-0.6585) (-0.6817) (-0.6093) (-0.0161)
6 Buy-sell 0.0027 0.0034 0.0038 0.0032
(2.0877) (2.9693) (3.6612) (3.6469)
9 Buy 0.0026 0.0035 0.0034 0.0034
(2.119) (3.061) (3.2159) (3.4521)
9 Sell -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0006
(-1.3453) (-1.2881) (-0.983) (-0.4663)
9 Buy-sell 0.0049 0.0054 0.0048 0.0040
(2.8105) (3.7652) (3.7538) (3.7212)
13 Buy 0.0032 0.0034 0.0034 0.0033
(2.8363) (3.1544) (3.2221) (3.3945)
13 Sell -0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0001
(-1.3502) (-0.9738) (-0.4948) (-0.054)
13 Buy-sell 0.0055 0.0048 0.0040 0.0034
(3.3047) (3.4207) (3.2261) (3.0743)
29Table 2: Betas and Market Capitalization of Relative Strength Portfolios
The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks
are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in
the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest




Middle 1/3 0.735 19.409
Sell 1.1947 12.437
Buy-Sell -0.0236
30Table 3: Monthly Returns of Size-based and Beta-based Relative Strength Portfolios
The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on
the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio and
A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return decile is the buy portfolio. The remaining are assigned in the
middle portfolio. Average monthly returns and excess returns of these portfolios and the returns of the relative strength portfolios formed
using size-based and beta-based subsamples of securities are reported here. Size is sorted in lower, middle and highest thirds. Panel A reports
average returns and Jensen's CAPM alphas. Panel B reports CAPM regressions augmented with a NBER Business Cycle dummy.
Panel A
Size-sorted Average returns and t-stats
All Small Medium Large
Past Returns
Sell -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0007
(-0.6817) (-1.01) (-1.4414) (-0.5188)
Middle 0.0020 -0.0018 0.0006 0.0021
(3.0078) (-1.042) (0.4981) (3.13)
Buy 0.0026 0.0014 0.0034 0.0024
(2.306) (0.7968) (2.7908) (2.0136)
Buy-Sell 0.0034 0.0033 0.0053 0.0031
(2.9693) (2.713) (6.0779) (2.4098)
Excess returns (Jensen's CAPM alphas)
Past Returns
Sell -0.0075 -0.0071 -0.0074 -0.0075
(-8.1057) (-3.7656) (-6.241) (-7.486)
Middle -0.0029 -0.0052 -0.0032 -0.0029
(-6.6399) (-2.8756) (-2.6764) (-6.6667)
Buy -0.004 -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0044
(-5.0428) (-1.5862) (-1.1498) (-4.9347)
Buy-Sell 0.0035 0.0043 0.0061 0.0031
(2.9840) (3.4295) (6.8496) (2.3639)




Jensen alphas with Market and NBER Business Cycle Dummy
All Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large
Jensen alphas Beta on NBER Business Cycle Dummy
(Dummy=1 if recession)
Past Returns
Sell -0.0074 -0.0058 -0.0048 -0.0077 -0.0004 -0.0025 -0.0052 0.0003
(-5.6204) (-2.2076) (-2.8974) (-5.4264) (-0.1968) (-0.6662) (-2.2123) (0.1533)
Middle -0.0028 -0.0037 -0.0019 -0.0028 -0.0003 -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0002
(-4.4469) (-1.4656) (-1.1618) (-4.5684) (-0.3852) (-0.8222) (-1.0538) (-0.2391)
Buy -0.0041 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0046 0.0002 -0.0036 -0.0023 0.0004
(-3.6934) (-0.3983) (-0.1022) (-3.6858) (0.1573) (-1.0369) (-1.0167) (0.2553)
Buy-Sell 0.0032 0.0048 0.0047 0.0031 6.08E-04 -0.0011 0.0028 1.44E-04
(1.9362) (2.7614) (3.7368) (1.6406) (0.2613) (-0.4610) (1.6222) (0.0551)
3
2Table 4: Sensitivity to treatment of exit rms - CAPM Alphas
In this table we relax the assumption that extinct stocks have -99.99 % return. The relative strength portfolios
are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on
the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past
return is the sell portfolio and A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return
decile is the buy portfolio. The remaining are assigned in the middle portfolio. Average monthly returns and
excess returns of these portfolios and the returns of the relative strength portfolios formed using size-based
and beta-based subsamples of securities are reported here. Size is sorted in lower, middle and highest thirds.
Exit rms set at -99.99 %
Small Medium Large
Sell -0.0071 -0.0074 -0.0075
(-3.7656) (-6.241) (-7.486)
Middle -0.0052 -0.0032 -0.0029
(-2.8756) (-2.6764) (-6.6667)
Buy -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0044
(-1.5862) (-1.1498) (-4.9347)
Buy-Sell 0.0043 0.0061 0.0031
(3.4295) (6.8496) (2.3639)
Exit rms not set at -99.99 %
Small Medium Large
Sell -0.0014 -0.0034 -0.0048
(-1.3781) (-5.0422) (-8.3276)
Middle 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0010
(2.1281) (2.1064) (-3.8416)
Buy 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0011
(2.4802) (4.6837) (-2.3061)
Buy-Sell 0.00380 0.0059 0.0037
(3.7387) (8.2087) (4.2804)
33Table 5: Sensitivity to treatment of exit rms - Average returns
We relaxed our assumptions by either ignoring the extinction (don't set the last return to -99.99%) or
ignoring all missing data by assuming it is missing completely at random (MCAR) and computing results
from observable data only. The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held
for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A value-
weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio and A value-weighted
portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return decile is the buy portfolio. The remaining are
assigned in the middle portfolio. Average monthly returns and excess returns of these portfolios and the
returns of the relative strength portfolios formed using size-based and beta-based subsamples of securities
are reported here. Size is sorted in lower, middle and highest thirds.
Size MCAR Not set Set
at -99.99 % at -99.99 %
Size-sorted Average monthly returns and t-stats
Buy - Sell
Small 0.0031 0.0028 0.0033
(3.0173) (2.8179) (2.7130)
Medium 0.0049 0.0049 0.0053
(6.6676) (6.8329) (6.0779)
Large 0.0034 0.0034 0.0031
(3.9647) (4.0896) (2.4098)
Excess returns (Jensen's CAPM alphas)
Buy - Sell
Small 0.0040 0.0037 0.0043
(4.0116) (3.7387) (3.4295)
Medium 0.0058 0.0059 0.0061
(8.1034) (8.2087) (6.8496)
Large 0.0037 0.0037 0.0031
(4.0850) (4.2804) (2.3639)
34Table 6: Monthly Returns on Size-based Relative Strength Portfolio by Calendar
Months
The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks
are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks
in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the
highest 67th percentile past return decile is the buy portfolio. Returns are 28-day, not monthly. January
returns are coded as the rst 28-day return entirely in the new year.
Month All Small Med Large
Panel A
Return on 6-6 portfolios: Losers
Jan 0.0020 0.0080 0.0039 0.0017
Feb-Dec -0.0010 -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0008
p-val for t-test 0.53 0.14 0.22 0.61
of equality with Jan
Return on 6-6 portfolios: Middle
Jan 0.0103 0.0096 0.0094 0.0105
Feb-Dec 0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0001 0.0015
p-val for t-test 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00
of equality with Jan
Return on 6-6 portfolios: Winners
Jan 0.0082 0.0087 0.0132 0.0076
Feb-Dec 0.0024 0.0008 0.0027 0.0023
p-val for t-test 0.17 0.25 0.03 0.24
of equality with Jan
Panel B: Return on Winner - Loser Portfolio
Jan 0.0063 0.0005 0.0095 0.006
(2.3922) (0.177) (4.3477) (2.0312)
Feb-Dec 0.0032 0.0035 0.005 0.0029
(2.5891) (2.7262) (5.3517) (2.0833)
t-test Ho: Jan = Feb through Dec
p-value 0.4694 0.5089 0.17 0.513
35Table 7: Momentum Portfolio Turnover: Transition Probability Matrix
The turnover of the relative strength portfolios is measured via a transition probability matrix for the K=6/J=6 strategy. The diagonal
elements are of most interest as they reveal what fraction of stocks remain in the portfolio.
Portfolio at time t
Size Small Med Large Small Med Large Small Med Large
Momentum Sell Sell Sell Med Med Med Buy Buy Buy
Small Sell 0.345 0.051 0.000 0.282 0.023 0.000 0.322 0.033 0.000
Med Sell 0.008 0.296 0.032 0.008 0.207 0.014 0.010 0.232 0.019
Probability Large Sell 0.000 0.009 0.306 0.001 0.007 0.211 0.000 0.008 0.243
of being in Small Med 0.202 0.008 0.000 0.281 0.009 0.000 0.212 0.009 0.000
Portfolio at Med Med 0.011 0.224 0.009 0.018 0.354 0.012 0.013 0.276 0.012
time t+6 Large Med 0.000 0.017 0.310 0.000 0.026 0.452 0.000 0.014 0.336
Small Buy 0.282 0.006 0.000 0.256 0.005 0.000 0.301 0.005 0.000
Med Buy 0.039 0.279 0.005 0.036 0.263 0.005 0.045 0.308 0.006
Large Buy 0.000 0.031 0.279 0.000 0.027 0.246 0.000 0.035 0.321
No Price at t+6 0.113 0.079 0.058 0.119 0.079 0.059 0.096 0.078 0.062
3
6Table 8: Bid-Ask Spread Statistics
The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order
on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio. A
value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return decile is the buy portfolio. Value weighted average of the Bid-Ask
spread of each security that is added or removed from the portfolio at time t, where Bid-Ask Spread = (Ask-Bid)/[average(bid,ask)]
Small Sell Med Sell Large Sell Small Mid Med Mid Large Mid Small Buy Med Buy Large Buy
Prob of remaining in portfolio
0.345 0.296 0.306 0.281 0.354 0.452 0.301 0.308 0.321
Bid-ask spread of those traded
0.21 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.02
Percentage of "new" stocks in new portfolio
0.655 0.704 0.694 0.719 0.646 0.548 0.699 0.692 0.679
Per period Bid-ask cost trading cost
0.0229 0.0106 0.0035 0.0168 0.0065 0.0018 0.0175 0.0081 0.0023
Per period costs in basis points
229 106 35 168 65 18 175 81 23
3
7Table 9: Momentum Prots and Market States
The Table reports evidence on market states and momentum prot similar to CGH (2004). At the beginning
of each month t, all stocks are allocated into deciles based on their lagged six-month returns (from t   5 to
t   1; skipping month t). Down, Avg and Up markets were dened as follows Up = market index return
over past 3 years in top 1/3 of sample Avg = market index return over past 3 years in middle 1/3 of sample
Down = market index return over past 3 years in Bottom 1/3 of sample. Prots of the momentum portfolios
(winner minus loser deciles) are cumulated across holding period months t + 1 to t + 6: Reported below are
the mean monthly prots and CAPM alphas.
CRSP Data 1929-1995 London Data 1869-1907
Monthly returns following 36 month UP-Markets (85 % of observed states)
Mean Ret. 0.004 0.0038
(3.800) (4.4555)
CAPM alpha 0.0053 0.0039
(4.8913) (4.5414)
Monthly returns following 36 month Down-Markets (15 % of observed states)
Mean Ret. -0.0028 0.0015
(-1.1061) (0.7713)
CAPM alpha -0.0002 0.0016
(-0.0971) (0.8158)
Test for equality Up-Down = 0
t-stat Mean Ret. 2.5055 1.0474
tstat: CAPM alpha 2.0031 1.0403
38Table 10: Factor-Model Predicted Monthly Returns and Momentum
All stocks are rst sorted each month t into quintiles based on their six-month (t   5 to t) predicted returns from the four-factor model:
(r   rf) = a + b1Mkt + b2(Divyld) + b3(Term) + b4(Default)
where excess return on market portfolio, Divyld: lagged dividend yield on market index, Term: lagged term spread (yield on British consol -
yield on 30day bankbill), and Default: lagged default yield (yield on risky bonds (brit RR) - yield on British consol). This table employs the
nonoverlapping-return method used by CS (2002). Panel B reports sorts based on predicted returns of the four factor model.
Panel A
Small Sell Med Sell Large Sell Small Mid Med Mid Large Mid Small Buy Med Buy Large Buy
b2 0.2964 -0.1459 0.174 0.0688 0.1374 -0.0584 0.018 0.0676 0.0562
(0.8799) (-0.6828) ( 0.9542) (0.2115) (0.6439) (-0.7423) (0.0568) (0.3213) (0.3479)
b3 0.3009 0.1767 -0.2143 0.4298 0.1904 0.1913 0.1549 0.3812 -0.0572
(0.6824) (0.6315) (-0.8977) (1.0088) 0.6817 1.8565 0.3722 1.3838 -0.2707
b4 0.5088 0.3196 0.0919 0.2999 0.3726 0.0705 0.4165 0.2669 -0.0412
(3.0051) (2.9753) (1.0031) (1.8330) (3.4753) (1.7812) (2.6067) (2.5231) (-0.5078)
F-stat: b2=b3=b4=0 4.3343 3.75 0.5343 2.1365 5.1524 2.9292 2.6002 4.0728 0.1689
p-val F 0.005 0.011 0.659 0.0947 0.0016 0.0332 0.0515 0.0071 0.9174




Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) predicted returns sort
Momentum Sorts: Sell Med Buy Buy-Sell
E[R] low 0.001 0.0028 0.0031 0.0021
(0.6279) (3.4371) (2.1358) (1.2509)
Factor sorts: E[R] med 0.001 0.0026 0.002 0.001
(1.0013) (3.9661) (1.9003) (0.9976)
E[R] high -0.0015 0.0013 0.0039 0.0054
(-0.9799) (1.4754) (3.0703) (3.7516)
high-low -0.0025 -0.0015 0.0008
(-1.6382) (-1.7748) (0.5686)
3
9Table 11: Momentum Prots and the Economy
The Table reports evidence on momentum prots and the state of the economy, in particular the results of
the regression:
r = a + b1  (Mkt) + b2  (GDP)
where r is annual the return on the 6-6 buy portfolio minus the return on the 6-6 sell portfolio and GDP is
the demeaned real per capita GDP growth. Note that in this table we examine annual returns - not monthly
- as GDP is only available at an annual frequency.
Size a b1 b2 Adj. R2
Small 0.06100 -0.3510 -0.8704 0.10
(3.4017) (-1.6974) (-1.2196)
Med. 0.0780 -0.1771 -0.4754 0.03
(5.9050) (-1.1626) (-0.9044)
Large 0.0321 0.1554 -0.8030 0.01
(2.3458) (0.9833) (-1.4718)
40Table 12: Correlations among series
The table displays full sample estimates of the correlations computed at an annual frequency between (1) returns on buy-sell small stock
portfolio, (2) buy-sell medium portfolio, (3) buy-sell large stock portfolio, (4) average cross-sectional monthly standard deviation, (5) excess
returns (Mkt - rf; (6) growth real GDP, (7) short term rate (Ordinary funds), and (8) long term rate.
Avg. Short
Buy-sell Buy-sell Buy-sell cross-sect. Mkt -rf Growth Term rate Long
small med large monthly st. rgdp/pc Ordinary term
dev. funds rate
Buy-sell small 1
Buy-sell med 0.02 1
Buy-sell large 0.14 0.10 1
avg cross-sect monthly st. dev. 0.17 0.12 0.15 1
Mkt - rf -0.33 -0.24 0.08 0.09 1
Growth rgdp/pc -0.28 -0.21 -0.19 -0.15 0.33 1
Short term rate Ordinary funds 0.16 0.00 0.13 -0.23 -0.41 -0.03 1
Long term rate -0.35 0.36 0.10 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.33 1
4
1Table 13: Monthly Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios - Long horizons
The relative strength portfolios are formed on J-month lagged returns and held for K months. The values
of J and K for the dierent strategies are indicated in the rst column and row respectively. The stocks
are ranked in ascending order on the basis of J-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks
in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the
highest 67th percentile past return decile is the buy portfolio. t-statistics are between parentheses. As noted
at the beginning of section 2, we considered 28-day periods as months in our calculations. Moreover, when
considering a year, i.e. K = 12 in Jegadeesh and Titman, we used 13 28-day periods. It is important to note
that the results are computed from all available time periods. This means the sample periods vary by column.
For example the portfolio return in year 2 after formation is computed by looking at the buy-sell portfolio
14-26 months after formation, so our rst "year 2" observation is July 1867-June 1868. Our rst "year 5"
observation doesn't begin until July 1871, however. Therefore the Year 2 column has more observations then
the Year 5 column. This is also why the various columns do not add up.
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 2-5 Year 3-5
J
3 Buy 0.0028 0.0028 0.0026 0.0019 0.0025 0.0024
(3.4085) (3.4459) (3.2127) (1.8392) (3.133) (2.9863)
3 Sell 0.0018 0.0024 0.0028 0.0031 0.0022 0.0027
(1.9838) (2.6039) (3.1467) (3.5481) (2.4413) (3.102)
3 Buy-sell 0.001 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0013 0.0004 -0.0003
(2.2551) (0.8765) (-0.4505) (-1.6807) (1.1792) (-1.0119)
6 Buy 0.0032 0.0032 0.0026 0.002 0.0028 0.0027
(3.90711) (4.1021) (3.071) (2.20911) (3.45531) (3.3621)
6 Sell 0.0015 0.0022 0.0033 0.0034 0.0022 0.0029
(1.4816) (2.1186) (3.3508) (3.4622) (2.2689) (2.9919)
6 Buy-sell 0.0017 0.001 -0.0006 -0.0014 0.0006 -0.0002
(2.6502) (1.4971) (-1.0493) (-2.1428) (1.1576) (-0.3828)
9 Buy 0.0033 0.003 0.0022 0.0021 0.0026 0.0025
(3.8523) (3.5455) (2.4311) (2.285) (3.1731) (2.9911)
9 Sell 0.0016 0.0027 0.0035 0.0034 0.0025 0.0032
(1.611) (2.5483) (3.4945) (3.1871) (2.5406) (3.3295)
9 Buy-sell 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0008
(2.1863) (0.3738) (-1.8331) (-1.6262) (0.1324) (-1.4513)
13 Buy 0.0035 0.0029 0.0018 0.0022 0.0026 0.0023
(4.0243) (3.439) (1.8966) (2.2931) (3.164) (2.6976)
13 Sell 0.0019 0.0027 0.004 0.0033 0.0029 0.0035
(1.7501) (2.5532) (3.7176) (2.8022) (2.7927) (3.4251)
13 Buy-sell 0.0016 0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0012
(1.9642) (0.2816) (-2.4996) (-1.1253) (-0.3999) (-1.9273)
42Table 14: Reversal equality tests
We form a T  N matrix X where X(t;n) is the holding period return from month (t   12) to month t
on the winner minus loser portfolio formed n  13 \months"earlier. Let ~ X(t;n)  (X(t;n + 1) - X(t;1)):
The entries to the table report the mean return of the winner minus loser portfolios 1 through 5 years after





t[ ~ X(t;4)]=T); and Cov(g) is estimated using the Newey-West procedure with 13 lags.
The test statistic is under the null W  2(4); asymptotically.
Average monthly return in
year N after formation
N 1 2 3 4 5
0.0034 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0015
Wald test that average monthly return
is equal in years 1 through 5:
35.14 (p-val = 0.00)
P-values for Wald test that average
monthly return in N years after
formation = average monthly return J years
after formation for any N, J
N = 1 2 3 4 5
J =1 -
J = 2 0.00 -
J = 3 0.00 0.16 -
J = 4 0.00 0.02 0.12 -
J = 5 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.22 -
43Figure 1: Momentum Prot Cycles
The gure displays the time series of the Fama-French momentum factor returns from January 1946 to May 2008 and the momentum factor
returns during the Victorian era.
4
4Figure 2: Number of Stocks in Portfolios
This study makes use of a new data set of 1,808 stocks (equity) listed in London between 1866 and 1907. The plots display the number of
stocks, which decline to 985 in 1903 and 544 in 1904 - due to a number of industries vanishing from the quotation list, only to reappear in
1905.
4
5Figure 3: Five-Year Rolling Average Returns on Size-based Relative Strength Portfolios
We report the average monthly excess return on the momentum portfolios during each of the ve years following portfolio formation, after
skipping a month. The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged return and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in
ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the
sell portfolio. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return decile is the buy portfolio.
4
6Figure 4: Winner and Looser Portfolio Investment
4
7Figure 5: Winner Minus Looser Investment
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